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COMMENT
Res Judicata Effects of Patent and Nonpatent
Determinations Under Section 337 of the Tariff
Act of 1930
The doctrine of res judicata prevents a party from relitigating
identical issues or claims in a second court action after a decision has
been rendered on the matter by another court.' Article III courts
have traditionally only applied res judicata to decisions rendered by
other Article III courts. 2 Increasingly, these courts have been willing
to extend res judicata effect to decisions made by administrative
agencies, so long as certain safeguards are met.3
Recently, the courts have considered whether or not to give
preclusive effect to an International Trade Commission (ITC) deter-
mination when a party pleads it in bar to a claim in federal court.
The courts have ruled that determinations by the ITC under section
337 of the Tariff Act of 19304 concerning patent claims are not to be
given preclusive effect in federal court5 while decisions involving
nonpatent issues are to be given preclusive effect.6 This Comment
will review these determinations and discuss whether there is an ade-
quate basis for the dichotomy created by the courts.
I. Background
A. Res Judicata
Resjudicata serves several useful purposes. First, it protects liti-
gants from relitigating the same issue with the same party in a sepa-
rate court proceeding.7 This avoids unnecessary cost to the
victorious party and also serves to foster judicial economy.8 A sec-
ond purpose served by res judicata is to prevent inconsistent deci-
18 C. WRIGHT, A. MILLER & E. COOPER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PRODEDURE [here-
inafter C. WRIGHT] § 4403 (1981).
2 Id. § 4475.
3 Id.
4 19 U.S.C. § 1337 (1988).
5 In re Convertible Rowing Exerciser Patent Litigation, 721 F. Supp. 596 (D. Del.
1989).
6 Baltimore Luggage Co. v. Samsonite Corp., 727 F. Supp. 202 (D. Md. 1989).
7 See C. WRIGHT, supra note 1, § 4403.
8 Id.
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sions.9 Litigating the same issue before two courts can produce
conflicting decisions. This problem is avoided by giving binding ef-
fect to the judgment of the first court. Yet another benefit of res
judicata is that it provides a final ending to disputes.' 0 Upon the
conclusion of the first court proceeding, the parties know their rights
and are free from the prospect of endless litigation.II
Certain requirements must be met before a court can apply
preclusive effect to a prior court determination. Res judicata is ap-
plicable if there is "(1) a final judgment on the merits in an earlier
suit, (2) an identity of the cause of action in both the earlier and the
later suit, and (3) an identity of parties or their privies in the two
suits. ' 1 2 These requirements are necessary to ensure that both par-
ties were present in the prior proceeding, that they were aware that
the issue was contained in the prior litigation, and that they had a full
and fair opportunity to litigate their claims in the first proceeding.
Once these requirements are met, res judicata may be applied.
B. Administrative Preclusion
Courts increasingly have given res judicata effect to decisions of
administrative agencies. There are several reasons for this trend.
First, agency proceedings have developed to the point where they
are essentially adjudicatory proceedings.' 3 Second, as agency pro-
ceedings have come more closely to resemble traditional judicial
models which the court systems trust, the courts have been willing to
afford them greater deference. 14 Finally, courts have come to realize
that in many cases the administrative agency has greater expertise in
its particular sphere and may be able to render a better decision than
the courts.' 5
The question of administrative resjudicata was addressed by the
Supreme Court in United States v. Utah Construction and Mining Co. 16
The Court stated that it is proper for a court to give res judicata
effect to an administrative proceeding "when an administrative
agency is acting in a judicial capacity and resolves disputed issues of
fact properly before it which the parties have had an adequate oppor-
9 Baltimore Luggage, 727 F. Supp. at 205.
10 C. WRIGHT, supra note 1, § 4403.
11 Id.
12 Baltimore Luggage, 727 F. Supp. at 205.
13 C. WRIGHT, supra note I § 4475.
14 Id.
15 Id.
16 384 U.S. 394 (1966). Justice White, speaking for the majority, held that the Board
of Contract Appeals was acting in a judicial capacity when it considered a government
contractor's claims for additional compensation and additional time on account of alleged
changed conditions. Id. at 422. The Court held that the Board's findings on factual dis-
putes clearly relevant to the issues, on which both parties had full and fair opportunity to
argue, were final and conclusive in a breach of contract action. Id.
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tunity to litigate."' 7 The fact that significant differences exist be-
tween administrative and judicial proceedings does not bar applying
the doctrine of res judicata.18 For example, res judicata "has been
accepted despite the absence of jury trial, limitations on discovery,
and general arguments that more evidence could be produced in a
second proceeding."' 19
Another factor taken into consideration in determining whether
to give preclusive effect to an administrative determination is the
competence of the agency in the matter.20 A court is more likely to
preclude a claim when the prior administrative decision was within
the particular agency's area of expertise. 2' Conversely, if the agency
decision -involves an issue outside of its jurisdiction or which it lacked
authority to decide, courts will hesitate to apply res judicata.22
C. Section 337
The International Trade Commission (ITC) is responsible for
determining when section 337 of the Tariff Act of 1930 is violated.23
Section 337 deals with unfair trade practices in the area of import
trade. Specifically, it provides:
unfair methods of competition and unfair acts in the importation of
articles into the United States, or in their sale by the owner, im-
porter, consignee, or agent of either, the effect or tendency of which
is to destroy or substantially injure an industry ... in the United
States, or to prevent the establishment of such an industry or to re-
strain or monopolize trade and commerce in the United States are
declared unlawful. 24
Upon the filing of a complaint, the ITC must initiate an investi-
gation of the alleged unfair import act.2 5 During the course of the
investigation a party may present all legal and equitable defenses
available. 26 If the ITC finds that section 337 has been violated it has
three remedies. First, it may direct the exclusion of the articles con-
cerned from the United States.2 7 Alternatively, the ITC may allow
17 Id.
18 C. WRIGHT, supra note 1, § 3375.
19 Id.
20 Id.
21 d.
22 Id.
23 Tariff Act of 1930, 19 U.S.C.A. § 1337(c) (West 1982). Section 1337 was amended
in 1988 and the text was substantially revised. For the purposes of this Comment the pre-
1988 version will be used since it was the statute considered by the courts. While the text
has changed, the general rules of the section are substantially the same and should not
affect the analysis undertaken by the courts.
24 Id. § 1337(a).
25 Id. § 1337(b)(1).
26 Id. § 1337(c).
27 Id. § 1337(d) provides:
If the Commission determines, as a result of an investigation under this sec-
tion, that there is a violation of this section, it shall direct that the articles
concerned, imported by any person violating the provision of this section, be
1990]
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the articles to be imported under bond. 28 As a third option, the ITC
may issue a cease and desist order.29 Before ordering any of these
three remedies the ITC must consider the effect of such an order
"upon the public health and welfare, competitive conditions in the
United States economy, the production of like or directly competi-
tive articles in the United States, and United States consumers." 30
The remedy ordered by the ITC can be appealed by "any person
adversely affected" by the decision.3 '
II. Preclusive Effect of ITC Determinations
A. Determinations of Patent Issues
The issue of whether an ITC decision concerning patent validity
should be given res judicata effect recently was considered in depth
in In re Convertible Rowing Exerciser Patent Litigation.3 2 The plaintiff in
that case initiated before the ITC a complaint that alleged that the
defendant committed unfair trade acts and violated section 337 by
excluded from entry into the United States, unless, after considering the ef-
fect of such exclusion upon the public'health and welfare, competitive condi-
tions in the United States economy, the production of like or directly
competitive articles in the United States, and United States consumers, it
finds that such articles should not be excluded from entry. The Commission
shall notify the Secretary of the Treasury of its action under this subsection
directing such exclusion from entry, and upon receipt of such notice, the
Secretary shall, through the proper officials, refuse such entry.
28 Id. § 1337(e) provides:
If, during the course of an investigation under this section, the Commission
determines that there is reason to believe that there is a violation of this
section, it may direct that the articles concerned, imported by any person
with respect to whom there. is reason to believe that such person is violating
this section, be excluded from entry into the United States, unless, after con-
sidering the effect of such exclusion upon the public health and welfare, com-
petitive conditions in the United States economy, the production of like or
directly competitive articles in the United States, and United States consum-
ers, it finds such articles should not be excluded from entry. The Commis-
sion shall notify the Secretary of the Treasury of its action under this
subsection directing such exclusion from entry, and upon receipt of such no-
tice, the Secretary shall, through the proper officers, refuse such entry, ex-
cept that such articles shall be entitled to entry under bond determined by
the Commission and prescribed by the Secretary.
29 Id. § 1337(0(1) provides:
In lieu of taking action under subsection (d) or (e) of this section, the Com-
mission may issue and cause to be served on any person violating this sec-
tion, or believed to be violating this section, as the case may be, an order
directing such person to cease and desist from engaging in the unfair meth-
ods or acts involved, unless after considering the effect of such order upon
the public health and welfare, competitive conditions in the United States
economy, the production of like or directly competitive articles in the United
States, and United States consumers, it finds that such order should not be
issued. The Commission may at any time, upon such notice and in such mat-
ter as it deems proper, modify or revoke any such order, and, in the case of a
revocation, may take action under subsection (d) or (e) of this section as the
case may be.
30 Id. § 1337(d), (e) & (f)(1).
31 Id. § 1337(c).
32 721 F. Supp. 596 (D. Del. 1989).
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importing goods which infringed the plaintiff's patent.3 3 The de-
fendant asserted that the patent was invalid and therefore could not
be infringed.34 The administrative law judge (ALJ) who conducted
the investigation concluded that the patent was invalid and that sec-
tion 337 had not been violated. 35 This decision was sustained by the
ITC and later affirmed by the Court of Appeals for the Federal Cir-
cuit.36 The plaintiff then instituted an action in federal district court
alleging that defendant infringed its patent.3 7
The question before the district court was whether the ITC's in-
validation of the patent in the course of a section 337 determination
that was upheld by the Federal Circuit should be given preclusive
effect.3 8 The defendant advanced two theories to prevent plaintiff
from relitigating the validity of the patent in federal court. It first
argued that "once a court determines a patent is invalid in a pro-
ceeding where the patent owner had a full and fair opportunity to
adjudicate, the patent owner is precluded from re-litigating the valid-
ity of the patent against all others." 3 9 Here, the plaintiff was the pat-
ent owner who had full opportunity to argue the validity of his patent
before the ITC. The defendant argued that the plaintiff should be
prevented from relitigating its validity in the federal courts.40 The
defendant's second argument was that administrative res judicata
prevented the district court from reviewing the ITC determination
because the ITC is a federal agency, acting in a judicial capacity,
before which the parties had a full opportunity to litigate their
claims. 41
The district court first considered the problems that would be
created if it did not give preclusive effect to the ITC determination.
The court pointed out that the failure to give preclusive effect to the
ITC decision could result in the court reaching a conclusion oppo-
site that of the ITC.4 2 Thus the court "would be placed in the awk-
ward position of disagreeing with a Federal Circuit decision... and
the same Court of Appeals would be asked to hear the appeal of the
33 d. at 597-98.
34 Id.
35 Id.
36 Id.
37 Id. at 597.
38 Id.
39 Id. at 598. The defendants argued that this rule, which was promulgated by the
Supreme Court in Blonder-Tongue Laboratories v. University ofIll. Found., 402 U.S. 313 (1971),
barred the plaintiff from relitigating the validity of the patent. Convertible Rowing, 721 F.
Supp. at 598. The district court agreed. Id. at 600-01.
40 Id. at 598.
41 Id. This argument is based on the language in United States v. Utah Constr. Co., 384
U.S. 394, 422 (1966).
42 Convertible Rowing, 721 F. Supp. at 599.
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decision by this court." 43
A second problem created by denying preclusion is the effect on
individuals who have relied on the Federal Circuit decision. It is pos-
sible that a person might invest money in bringing a product to mar-
ket in reliance on the Federal Circuit decision concerning ITC
section 337 patent validity only to be undercut by a later decision
concerning the same patent in federal district court.44
The court also believed that prior precedent might compel
granting preclusive effect to ITC patent determinations. The court's
belief resulted from an examination of the language of the Supreme
Court's decision in Blonder-Tongue Laboratories v. University of Illinois
Foundation.45 There, the Supreme Court stated that
once an issue has been fully adjudicated and a [d]istrict [c]ourt has
determined that a patent is valid, unless a party against whom estop-
pel is sought can demonstrate that he did not previously have a full
and fair opportunity to adjudicate the issue, the question of patent
validity cannot be relitigated in any subsequent proceeding.
The district court found that plaintiff had received a full and fair
chance to be heard before the ITC and that the decision by the ITC
was competent. 47 This weighed in favor of giving preclusive effect.
In fact, the court believed that an argument could be made for pre-
clusion based solely on Utah Construction, the landmark case which
allowed res judicata effect to be given to administrative decisions.48
In order to apply res judicata to enforce repose, the Supreme
Court in Utah Construction stated that the following requirements
must be satisfied: (1) the administrative agency must be acting in a
judicial capacity; (2) the factual disputes must be clearly relevant to
the issues properly before the agency; (3) both parties must have a
full and fair opportunity to argue their version of the facts; and (4)
there must be an opportunity to seek court review of any adverse
findings. 49 The court in Convertible Rowing determined that the Utah
Construction test was met because the ITC was acting in a judicial
capacity and the parties had a full and fair opportunity to litigate
before the ITC. 50
Despite these considerations, the district court held that the ITC
decision did not bar subsequent consideration of patent issues by a
federal district court.51 The paramount reason cited by the court for
43 Id. Appeals from district courts on patent matters are heard by the Federal Circuit.
28 U.S.C. § 1292(c)(2) (1982).
44 Convertible Rowing, 721 F.Supp. at 599.
45 402 U.S. 313 (1971).
46 Id. at 350.
47 Convertible Rowing, 721 F. Supp. at 600.
48 See supra note 16 and accompanying text.
49 Utah Constr., 384 U.S. at 422.
50 Convertible Rowing, 721 F. Supp. at 600-01
51 Id.
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this conclusion was that original and exclusive jurisdiction in patent
matters has been vested by Congress in the federal district courts.5 2
Conversely, original jurisdiction over unfair import practices has
been granted to the ITC.53 Thus, "Congress, in promulgating the
jurisdictional parameters for the ITC and the federal [d]istrict
[c]ourts, created two separate jurisdictions to consider two distinct
questions." 54 Both the ITC and the district courts can consider pat-
ent issues. However, "[t]he question the ITC examines under sec-
tion 337 and the question the [d]istrict [clourt examines under [its
jurisdictional statute] are ... quite different in both form and sub-
stance."5 5 The ITC considers patent validity only to determine if an
unfair trade practice has occurred under section 337.56 On the other
hand, the district courts are charged with determining patent valid-
ity, enforceability, and infringement. 57 Therefore, a decision made
before the ITC should not be given preclusive effect in the federal
court. The ITC can make a determination for its purposes but these
determinations "are properly not accorded resjudicata effect because
the ITC has no jurisdiction to determine patent validity except to the
limited extent necessary to decide a case otherwise properly before
it. "58
The decision of the Convertible Rowing court is further supported
by the legislative history of the 1974 amendments to section 337.
Congress stated that it is necessary for the ITC to "review the valid-
ity and enforceability of patents, for the purposes of section 337, in
accordance with contemporary legal standards." 59 However, "the
[ITC] is not, of course, empowered.., to set aside a patent as being
invalid or to render it unenforceable, and the extent of the [ITC's]
authority.., is to take into consideration such defenses and to make
findings thereon for the purposes of determining whether section
337 is being violated."'60 The ITC's decisions concerning patent va-
lidity "neither purport to be, nor can they be, regarded as binding
interpretations of the U.S. patent laws in particular factual con-
texts." 6' These statements make it clear that Congress intended to
limit the preclusive effect of ITC patent decisions.
The last area addressed by the district court in Convertible Rowing
52 Id. The applicable jurisdictional statute for the district courts is 28 U.S.C. § 1338
(1982).
53 Convertible Rowing, 721 F. Supp. at 601. The applicable statutes are 19 U.S.C.
§§ 1332(b) and 1337 (1982).
54 Convertible Rowing, 721 F. Supp. at 601.
55 Id.
56 Id.
57 Id.
58 Union Mfg. Co. v. Han Baek Trading Co., 763 F.2d 42, 45 (2d Cir. 1985).
59 S. REP No. 1298, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 196, reprinted in 1974 U.S. CODE CONG. &
ADMIN. NEWS 7186, 7329.
6 Id.
61 Id.
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was the effect of the Federal Circuit's decision upholding the ITC
determination. The district court stated that it is usually bound by
decisions of the Federal Circuit because any appeal from the district
court on patent matters is heard by the Federal Circuit.62 According
to the district court, this problem is eliminated by the Federal Cir-
cuit's decision in Lannom Manufacturing Co., v. ITC.63 In that case, the
court stated that "its appellate treatment of ITC determinations as to
patent validity does not estop other tribunals from considering anew
the question of patent validity." 64 Presumably this is due to the fact
that the Federal Circuit's review of patent issues on appeal from the
ITC and from the federal district court are fundamentally different in
nature.65
The Convertible Rowing court held that, given "[t]he statements
by Congress and the courts as to the effect of ITC determinations
under section 337 ... and the stark contrast in both form and sub-
stance between questions on appeal before the Federal Circuit from
the ITC and the [d]istrict [c]ourt," an ITC determination of patent
validity, affirmed by the Federal Circuit, does not prevent a federal
district court from considering the validity of the identical patent
under the jurisdiction granted to it by Congress. 66
B. Preclusive Effect Given Nonpatent Issues
The more difficult question is whether an ITC determination
made in an area other than patent law should be given preclusive
effect in a federal district court. Unlike patents, there is no clear
mandate in either section 337 or its legislative history to guide the
courts on this question. Two circuit courts recently answered this
question in the affirmative and granted preclusive effect to an ITC
nonpatent determination.
The first of these cases is Union Manufacturing Co. v. Han Baek
Trading Co. 6 7 It involved a company, Union Manufacturing (Union),
that had manufactured stainless steel vacuum bottles for approxi-
mately twenty years. 68 Most of the bottles were sold bearing Union's
registered trademark, "UNO-VAC." 69 The defendant, Han Baek,
imported a bottle into the United States that was similar to the Union
product. 70
In response to the bottle's importation, Union filed a complaint
62 Convertible Rowing, 721 F. Supp. at 602. The applicable statute is 28 U.S.C.
§ 1292(c)(2) (1982).
63 799 F.2d. 1572 (Fed. Cir. 1986).
64 Id. at 1577-78 n.12.
65 See supra notes 50-58 and accompanying text.
66 Convertible Rowing, 721 F. Supp. at 603-04.
67 763 F.2d 42 (2d Cir. 1985).
68 Id. at 43.
69 Id.
70 Id.
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with the ITC alleging a violation of section 337.71 The ITC initiated
an investigation to determine if an unfair trade practice existed due
to the "alleged (1) infringement of [Union's] common-law trade-
mark, (2) passing off, or (3) false designation of origin." 72 After de-
termining that Union had established a common-law trademark, the
administrative law judge held that consumers were likely to confuse
Han Baek's bottle with the Union bottle." The ITC reversed the
ALJ's decision concluding that Union did not possess a common-law
trademark. 74 Union then chose to initiate a proceeding in federal
district court rather than appeal the ITC decision to the Federal Cir-
cuit.7 5 The defendant responded by raising the affirmative defense
of res judicata based on the ITC's administrative determination.7 6
The Union Manufacturing court first concluded that the fact that
the ITC was an administrative agency did not prevent the application
of res judicata principles. The court stated that when the issues ar-
gued before the ITC and the procedures available there "are in all
important respects the same as those in the [d]istrict [c]ourt, resjudi-
cata should bar the relitigation of the claim in federal court." 77 The
court reasoned that once Union chose to proceed before the ITC,
there was no apparent reason why Union should not be required to
take "the exclusive avenue of appeal afforded by law-review of ITC
decisions by the Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit. ' 78 Other-
wise, the court felt that the legitimacy of ITC proceedings could be
undermined by parties "filing in a district court what amounts to a
collateral attack on the ITC determination." 79
The result in Union Manufacturing is distinguishable from ITC
patent litigation because the ITC "has full authority to decide trade-
mark claims concerning imported goods, and the jurisdiction of the
federal district courts over unfair trade practice and trademark cases
is not exclusive." 80 Based on these considerations, the Second Cir-
cuit stated that it would give res judicata effect to decisions reached
by the ITC concerning unfair trade practice and trademark claims.81
Baltimore Luggage Co. v. Samsonite8 2 involved substantially the
same circumstances as Union Manufacturing. Baltimore Luggage
Company (Baltimore) began to market a new line of hard luggage in
71 Id. at 44.
72 Id.
73 Id.
74 Id.
75 Id.
76 Id.
77 Id. at 45 (citation omitted).
78 Id.
79 Id.
80 Id. at 45-46. This is as opposed to patent litigation where the district court is
granted original and exclusive jurisdiction. See supra notes 50-58 and accompanying text.
81 Union Mfg., 763 F.2d at 46.
82 727 F. Supp. 202 (D. Md. 1989).
1990]
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1985.83 Samsonite felt that this new line infringed upon its com-
mon-law trademark rights in a similar line of luggage it sold,84 but it
was Baltimore that took the offensive by filing a three-count com-
plaint in federal district court.85 The first count of Baltimore's com-
plaint was a declaratory judgment action asking the court to find that
Samsonite did not have common-law trademark rights in the dis-
puted articles, that Baltimore's luggage did not infringe on any valid
trademark held by Samsonite, and that Baltimore was not guilty of
any unfair trade practices. The second count alleged that Samsonite
was guilty of attempting to monopolize the molded luggage market
and other violations of antitrust law. The third count was a common-
law unfair competition claim.8 6 Samsonite answered with four coun-
terclaims against Baltimore.8 7 The counterclaims were for patent
infringement; Lanham Act violations; common law trademark in-
fringement and unfair competition; and violations of the state Con-
sumer Protection Act.88
While this action was pending, Samsonite filed a complaint with
the ITC alleging that Baltimore's importation of molded luggage vi-
olated section 337.89 In response, Baltimore affirmatively alleged
that Samsonite possessed unclean hands and had violated antitrust
laws.90 On the basis of an ITC-initiated investigation, the ALJ con-
cluded that Samsonite did not have trademark rights in its molded
luggage. 9 1 The ALJ also determined that "the record does not sup-
port a finding of bad faith, inequitable and/or other conduct on the
part of complainant [Samsonite] to warrant a holding of trademark
misuse, unclean hands and/or antitrust violations." 92
Samsonite appealed the decision to the ITC and it declined re-
view. 93 Samsonite then appealed that decision to the Federal Cir-
cuit. Baltimore was allowed to intervene in the Federal Circuit
appeal. 94 On appeal, Baltimore neither raised any of its previous af-
firmative defenses nor challenged the ALJ's ruling concerning
them.95 The Federal Circuit affirmed the ITC's disposition of the
matter.96
Following the Federal Circuit decision, Samsonite moved for
83 Id. at 203.
84 Id.
85 Id.
86 Id. at 203-04.
87 Id. at 204.
88 Id.
89 Id.
90 Id.
91 Id.
92 Id.
93 Id.
94 Id.
95 Id.
96 Id.
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summary judgment in federal district court on the antitrust and un-
fair competition claims raised by Baltimore.97 Samsonite reasoned
that the ITC's decision finding no antitrust violations, trademark
misuse, or unclean hands should prohibit the district court's consid-
eration of these claims under the doctrine of res judicata.98
The district court agreed with Samsonite. It stated that Balti-
more was a party to the prior litigation, was entitled to utilize ITC
discovery procedures, had a chance to cross-examine Samsonite's
witnesses, and generally "had ample opportunity to litigate its af-
firmative defenses before the ALJ." 99 The court went on to state
that "[u]nless Baltimore can demonstrate that it did not have a full
and fair opportunity to adjudicate an issue before the ITC, the issues
determined there cannot be relitigated in any subsequent proceed-
ing."' 00 Thus, Baltimore was barred by res judicata from having the
district court examine the issues in its complaint which it raised as
affirmative defenses in the ITC proceeding.
IH. Rethinking Union Manufacturing and Baltimore Luggage
The rationales set forth by the courts in Union Manufacturing and
Baltimore Luggage supporting the granting of preclusive effect in fed-
eral district court to ITC decisions outside of patent law at first
glance appear to be persuasive. However, the court-created dichot-
omy that gives preclusive effect to ITC decisions on the basis of the
subject matter of the proceeding is flawed. Preclusive effect should
not be granted by federal district courts to ITC determinations made
on nonpatent issues for the same reasons that ITC patent law deci-
sions are not given preclusive effect.
Perhaps the party most interested in whether or not preclusive
effect is given to ITC determinations is the ITC itself. In Baltimore
Luggage, the ITC filed an amicus curiae brief arguing that decisions of
the ITC should never be given preclusive effect in federal court.' 0 '
This is a surprising position that the courts have claimed may be un-
dermined by a contrary decision. The ITC, in its brief, argued that
section 337 "was not intended to displace, but to supplement, other
provisions of law, and that Congress intended that ... dispositions
before the ITC ... should not have a res judicata or collateral estop-
pel effect in cases ... before the federal court."' 0 2 The ITC's posi-
tion is supported by the actual language of section 337, which states
that "[u]nfair methods of competition and unfair acts in the importa-
tion of articles into the United States ... are declared unlawful, and
97 Id.
98 Id.
99 Id. at 205.
100 Id.
101 Id.
102 Id.
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when found by the Commission to exist shall be dealt with, in addition
to any other provisions of law, as provided in this section."103 Thus, ITC
decisions are not to displace federal court decisions but to supple-
ment them as a means for providing a greater means of protecting
domestic industry from unfair import practices. The court in Balti-
more Luggage dismissed this argument, stating that while Congress
clearly intended section 337 to supplement existing law, it was to do
so by providing a more effective remedy to those already in place.t°4
Congress did not intend "adjudications made during a section 337
proceeding to be supplemental to adjudications in other proceed-
ings."' 0 5 The court concluded that giving preclusive effect to ITC
determinations does not frustrate Congress's intent to provide an
additional remedy. 10 6
The position of the court is again undermined by the text of
section 337. It provides for an investigation to terminate no later
than one year after it is initiated. 0 7 It goes on to state that "there
shall be excluded any period of time during which such investigation
is suspended because of proceedings in a court or agency of the
United States involving similar questions concerning the subject
matter of such investigation."' l08 The legislative history says that
such a suspension "may be undertaken by the [ITC], as an exercise
of its own discretion, or as a result of a court order to the same ef-
fect.' 1 9 This is a clear indication that when the ITC and the federal
courts have substantially similar questions before them, Congress fa-
vors those questions being adjudicaked by the courts rather than the
ITC. This supports the ITC view that its purpose is to supplement
existing law rather than displace it.
The legislative history to section 337 contains further language
supporting the ITC's position. It states in relevant part that:
The relief provided for violations of section 337 is "in addition to"
that granted in "any other provisions of law." The criteria of section
337 differ in a number of respects from other statutory provisions
for relief against unfair trade practices. For example, in patent-
based cases, the Commission considers, for its own purposes under
section 337, the status of imports with respect to the claims of U.S.
patents. The Commission's findings neither purport to be, nor can
they be, regarded as binding interpretations of the U.S. patent laws
in particular factual contexts. Therefore, it seems clear that any dis-
position of a Commission action by a [f]ederal [c]ourt should not
103 19 U.S.C.A. § 1337(a) (West 1982) (emphasis added).
104 Baltimore Luggage, 727 F. Supp. at 206.
105 Id.
106 Id.
107 19 U.S.C.A. § 1337(b)(1) (West 1982). This section allows the ITC eighteen
months to conduct a complex investigation.
108 Id.
109 S. REP No. 1298, supra note 59, at 7,327.
[VOL. 15
RES JUDICATA
have a res judicata or collateral estoppel effect in cases before such
courts.I 10
This is the language that courts have used to justify not giving
preclusive effect to ITC patent decisions. This makes sense since the
legislative history uses patent law as an explicit example of the type
of adjudication to which preclusive effect is not to be applied. How-
ever, the courts have refused to view this language as compelling.
The court in Baltimore Luggage reasoned that while the last sentence
of the paragraph, if read by itself, supports the ITC's position, it
must be read in the context of the entire paragraph.' The court
concluded that "in context the statement refers to patent validity
matters as described in the remainder of the paragraph."' "1 2 Thus,
the court sees the last sentence as applicable only in patent matters
and not in other areas.
This is a questionable reading of the legislative history. The
paragraph begins by pointing out that section 337 is in addition to
any other provisions of law. The statement is not limited to patents.
The history further states that the criteria of section 337 differ from
other statutory provisions for relief against unfair trade. Again, the
statement is not limited solely to patents. An example of one of
these differences is then given. The sentence starts "for example"
and gives a patent law example. The sentence ends by stating that it
seems clear that an ITC determination should not be given preclu-
sive effect by a federal court. This last statement is not qualified to
include only patents. Patent law appears in this paragraph only as an
example of the differences between an ITC determination and a fed-
eral court determination which justify not giving preclusive effect to
any ITC decision in federal court. The paragraph could have been
written as easily by substituting the word trademark for patent. The
focus of the paragraph is on the preclusive effect of all ITC determi-
nations, not just those involving patents.
It seems logical that an ITC determination involving nonpatent
areas should not be given preclusive effect due to differences in crite-
ria which exist between ITC determinations and federal court deter-
minations. As in the area of patents, the ITC examines trademark
and other areas of law to determine whether section 337 has been
violated. The ITC should be limited to deciding trademark, anti-
trust, common-law unfair trade practice, and other nonpatent claims
solely for the purpose of determining whether a violation of section
337 has occurred.'13 The federal court would then be free to decide
110 Id. at 7,329.
111 Baltimore Luggage, 727 F. Supp. at 206.
112 Id.
11S This result has been urged in the antitrust area. "Antitrust policy should play a
role in section 337 cases only in the manner intended by Congress when the section was
amended in 1974-as a check in the framing of relief that protects U.S. industry," Ward,
1990]
N.C.J. INT'L L. & COM. REG.
these issues de novo in order to determine if, for example, a trade-
mark is valid or an antitrust violation has occurred. The ITC consid-
ers nonpatent matters as they relate to unfair trade, while the district
court examines nonpatent matters to determine violations of law.
These determinations are as fundamentally different in substance
and form as a patent determination under section 337 is from a pat-
ent determination in federal court. Should a patent decision not be
given preclusive effect in federal court because the determination is
"quite different in both form and substance"''14 from the federal
court determination, then preclusive effect should not be given to a
nonpatent determination for the same reason.
The court in Baltimore Luggage argued that the difference in
preclusive effect accorded in patent and nonpatent areas can be ac-
counted for by the fact that the ITC is statutorily prohibited from
determining patent validity because exclusive jurisdiction is granted
to the federal district courts while jurisdiction for determining trade-
mark validity and violations of other areas of law is not exclusive to
the federal district courts and can be decided by the ITC.l15 This
argument fails because it does not address the fact that determina-
tions of the ITC and the federal district court are often made on the
basis of differing criteria and are thus fundamentally different
questions.
A final consideration that weighs against giving preclusive effect
to nonpatent determinations by the ITC was raised in Baltimore Lug-
gage. In that case it was pointed out that the ITC lacked authority to
grant Baltimore the affirmative relief requested in its claims against
Samsonite.' 16 The ITC has the ability to exclude articles from being
imported into the United States and may order a party to cease and
desist from violating section 337.117 The ITC has no ability to award
damages in the event that it finds trademark infringement or an anti-
trust violation. The courts have left unanswered the questions of
where a party entitled to damages would have to go to receive. its
damage award, and whether parties are doomed to their fate by liti-
gating before the ITC.
IV. A Suggestion to Litigants
The practical question is what a litigant should do if found in the
The Tariff Act of 1930-Section 337: An Antitrust Ugly Duckling, 27 ANTITRUST BULL. 355, 357
(1982). "The protection of individual competitors is not necessarily compatible with the
antitrust objective of preserving vigorous competition. There is no evidence that Con-
gress intended the ITC to operate under a schizophrenic mandate to pursue both ends
when dealing with imports." Id.
114 In re Convertible Rowing Exerciser Patent Litigation, 721 F. Supp. 596, 601 (D.
Del. 1989).
1 15 Baltimore Luggage, 727 F. Supp. at 207.
116 Id. at 205.
117 19 U.S.C.A. § 1337(d) & (f(1) (West 1982).
546 [VOL. 15
RES JUDICATA
position of being in concurrent ITC and federal district court pro-
ceedings where there are substantially similar issues which, if de-
cided by the ITC, will be given preclusive effect in the district court.
The first line of defense would be for the litigant to ask the ITC to
stay its investigation because of the existence of the federal court
proceeding involving similar issues."l 8 If this fails, the litigant can
move for the federal court to issue a stay of the ITC investigation
pending the completion of the federal court proceedings." 19 A party
could thus obtain relief in the federal courts and then proceed with
the ITC action. If for some reason the ITC proceeding is not stayed,
then the only other option open to a party is to fully contest each
matter before the ITC in its investigation and follow the appeals pro-
cess to the Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit.
V. Conclusion
The decision of the courts to give res judicata effect to ITC deci-
sions involving nonpatent issues while denying preclusive effect to
patent issues seems an arbitrary decision at best. Many of the same
reasons which justify not giving preclusive effect to patent decisions
support the same result in nonpatent issues before the ITC. How-
ever, the courts have chosen to ignore these considerations and con-
tort the language of section 337 and its legislative history to justify
the dichotomy they have created.
KEITH JOHN MERRITT
118 This is done under 19 U.S.C.A. § 1337(b)(1) (West 1982). See supra notes 107-109
and accompanying text.
I19 S. REP. No. 1298, supra note 59.
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